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The notion of a ‘Universal Grammar’ has a long tradi-
tion in Western European thought, stretching back at
least as far as the work of the 13th Century English phi-
losopher Roger Bacon ?12141294?, who provided the
Latin title to this piece1?. In the present era, the idea of
Universal Grammar ?or ‘UG’? is most closely associated
with Noam Chomsky and his followers, and is illustrated
by the following quote :
‘All languages, known and conceivable, are cut from
the same pattern. ??1?’ /Or consider this from Steven
Pinker’s book The Language Instinct :
‘According to Chomsky, a visiting Martian scientist
would surely conclude that apart from their mutually
unintelligible vocabularies, Earthlings speak a single
language ??2? : 232?.’
This proposition has often been challenged. Through-
out the history of linguistic thought, an opposing view
has been propounded, namely, that there are fundamen-
tal and irreconcilable grammatical differences between
languages, such that the underlying syntactic and seman-
tic rules and categories that determine the grammar of
one language are simply inapplicable to many others.
Each language is sui generis ?‘its own kind’?, as Latin
scholars might say. As noted by Steiner ?1972?, this
counter-proposal has also had a long tradition, from the
Biblically-inspired thinking of medieval philosophers
such as Pierre Helie in the 12th Century, through the
writings of the German linguist Alexander von Humboldt,
to the current work of linguists Nicholas Evans and Ste-
phen Levinson, whose rejection of Language Universals
is based on extensive fieldwork in ethnographic linguis-
tics, rather than on religious authority.
Evans & Levinson ?2009? begin their paper, appropri-
ately entitled ‘The Myth of Language Universals’, with
the following assertion :
Languages are much more diverse in structure than
cognitive scientists generally appreciate. A wide-
spread assumption among cognitive scientists, grow-
ing out of the generative tradition in linguistics, is that
all languages are English-like but with different sound
systems and vocabularies. The true picture is very dif-
ferent : languages differ so fundamentally from one an-
other at every level of description ?sound, grammar,
lexicon, meaning? that it is very hard to find any single
structural property they share ?3?.
In the last century, rejection of language universals
and of Universal Grammar was closely associated with
the American Structuralist tradition : for example, with
Martin Joos ?19071978?, who wrote : ‘Languages ?can?
differ from each other without limit . . . and in unpredict-
able ways ? Joos 1957 : 96?’ ; and, especially with the
American linguist Edward Sapir, and his student Benja-
min Lee Whorf, whose names combine to give the Sapir-
Whorf ?or Whorf-Sapir? Hypothesis, which not only as-
sumes that languages are fundamentally different from
one another, but which claims that these differences
have a determining influence on the way we think, shap-
ing our categories of thought, and constraining the ways
in which we are able to perceive reality.
Perhaps the most often cited quotation concerning this
proposal comes from Sapir ?1929? :
The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a
large extent unconsciously built upon the language
habits of the group . . . No two languages are ever suf-
ficiently similar to be considered as representing the
same social reality. The worlds in which different so-
cieties live are distinct worlds, not merely the same
world with different labels attached. ??4??
??
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This quote highlights a profound implication of the
strong relativist approach : if languages can vary without
limit?and if the language we speak determines the
shape of our concepts, the form and range of our
thoughts?then speaking a different language implies a
different way of seeing the world, not just a different way
of communicating experience. It also suggests that
translation, even by the most skilled interpreters, can
never be fully successful : if you were to read this in Japa-
nese, the message you would receive would not be ex-
actly what you would have understood had you read it in
English, not merely because we use different words, but
because we operate with different conceptual categories.
We can never really understand each other.
However, such a prospect should not be a cause for
concern, since?to anticipate matters somewhat?the
conclusion of this article will be that neither of the above
premisses is true : that is to say, languages do not vary
without limit, and the evidence that the language we
speak fundamentally determines the thoughts we can en-
tertain is in fact rather slim, despite indications to the
contrary.
From a lay perspective, perhaps in the view of most
readers, it seems obvious that the rejectionist position is
correct. Languages surely are very different from one
another at many levels, in their phonology ?sound pat-
terns and pronunciation?, morphology ?patterns of affixa-
tion and word-formation?, and above all in their lexicons
?their vocabulary?. All of these differences present often
insurmountable challenges to second language learners,
most of whom struggle for years, spending a consider-
able amount of time, money and effort, to achieve a
measure of fluency in, and mastery of, a language that is
literally ‘child’s play’ for any four year-old native-
speaker. And almost all of us fall short of even this mod-
est goal : only a tiny percentage of second language learn-
ers can ever ‘pass for native’. The reasons why children
acquire languages so easily are largely the subject of an-
other lecture, though the fact that they do so uniformly
provides significant motivation for the Chomskyan posi-
tion, as we shall see.
What concerns us immediately, though, are the obvi-
ous difficulties that adults face. Surely, you may think,
these difficulties are due to the fact that the grammars of
natural languages are so different from one another.
After all, if it was simply a matter of learning new words
for things, Japanese learners of English should be at a
great advantage over many other foreign learners, given
the fact that Japanese has borrowed tens of thousands of
English words into common usage ?gairaigo?, where
many other languages have adapted native words to
translate English terms.
Yet in spite of borrowing more English words than
most other developed nations, this has not improved
learning outcomes. Indeed, just the opposite seems to be
true : in terms of English proficiency scores such as
TOEIC, for example, Japan ranks close to the bottom in
international league tables. Of course, there are some
reasons for this that have nothing to do with language per
se. Proportionately, many more Japanese than Chinese
take the TOIEC exam?often before they are ready?
and they repeat it over and over again, thus lowering the
average. Nor is it clear that proficiency tests of this type
have any genuine validity, if we are really concerned with
knowledge and use of language, as opposed to standard-
ized testing. But that is a debate for another day. In any
case, problems with learning other languages are by no
means restricted to Japanese learners. Native Anglo-
phones fare little better : most monolingual British and
American speakers’ abilities in languages other than
English are woeful, bordering on the abysmal. So there
must be some other, more fundamental, reason why
English is so hard for you ; conversely, why Japanese is
so difficult for me. Our grammars?perhaps even our
modes of thought?must be really different. That’s right?
Deshoo?
In the rest of this article, I shall examine some of the
evidence for and against Universal Grammar. Beginning
with the Old Testament ?Genesis 1011?, I will examine
how the notion of Universal Grammar has developed
over time, according to the religious, social and political
views of contemporary commentators, and?more im-
portantly?according to the available empirical evidence.
I focus on two kinds of putative universal. First, I con-
sider semantic universals, the idea that the words and
sentences of different languages label?or map onto?a
common ?universal? set of underlying concepts : we may
not share the labels, but we share the semantic con-
cepts?. After that, I’ll consider syntactic universals, the
idea that the abstract grammatical rules used to build
?????? ??? ????? ?????????
sentences share a common format, very possibly due to
our biological inheritance, as Chomsky claims. It will be
argued that although languages do vary in striking and of-
ten unexpected ways on the surface, and in spite of some
important and interesting differences in the ways in
which we use language to categorize our perceptions and
to report on experience, the evidence nevertheless
strongly favours a Universalist explanation, especially in
the area of syntax, and speaks against Relativist alterna-
tives.
In the spirit of the original invitation for this article2?,
I begin with the Bible ?though not with the New Testa-
ment : the Old Testament is the best I can do?. In In
Search of the Perfect Language the Italian author and phi-
lologist Umberto Eco ?5? draws attention to a well-
known inconsistency in the Book of Genesis. The famil-
iar Tower of Babel story comes from Genesis 11 :
5 And the Lord came down to see the city and the
tower, which the children built. 6 And the Lord said,
Behold, the people is one, and they have all one lan-
guage ; and this they begin to do ; and now nothing will
be restrained from them, which they have imagined to
do. 7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their
language, that they may not understand one another’s
speech. 8 So the Lord scattered them abroad from
thence upon the face of all the earth : and they left off
to build the city. 9 Therefore is the name of it called
Babel ; because the Lord did there confound the lan-
guage of all the earth : and from thence did the Lord
scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
From this event, according to common Judaeo-
Christian understanding of the Old Testament, derives
the diversity of human languages. Yet Eco reminds us
that already in Genesis 10, there is mention of the ?ap-
parently? pre-existing diversity of human languages :
there it is written that, of each of Noah’s sons, Shem,
Ham and Japheth, their tribes had each their own distinc-
tive set of languages :
‘The descendants of Japheth ?there follows a long list
of names? . . . These are the descendants of Japheth in
their lands, with their own language, by their families,
in their nations . . . ‘The descendants of Ham . . . ?there
follows another list of names? . . . These are the de-
scendants of Ham, by their families, their languages,
their lands, and their nations . . . ‘To Shem also, the
father of all the children of Eber, the elder brother of
Japheth, children were born. The descendants of
Shem . . . ?another list follows? . . . these are the de-
scendants of Shem, by their families, their languages,
their lands, and their nations.
The clear implication of this genealogical discussion is
that the languages of the descendants of Noah had diver-
sified before the Lord destroyed the tower at Babel. Bib-
lical scholars may debate the chronological order in
Genesis, but whatever one’s view of the origins of and
reasons for linguistic diversity, the question that remains
unanswered is the extent to which, beneath the surface,
languages remain fundamentally the same; whether, to
use a current biological metaphor, they ‘share the same
DNA’.
So are there universals of language? Over the centu-
ries, commentators have had contrasting responses to
this idea, ranging from universalists, including the thir-
teenth century Doctor Mirabilis ?‘wonderful teacher’?
Roger Bacon ?12141294?, to relativists such as Evans
& Levinson. In detailing the history of universal claims,
Cliff Goddard & Anna Wierzbicka pose the question :
‘Why did Bacon believe this ?viz., that ?g?rammatica
una et eadem est . . . in omnibus linguis?? . . . Because
he believed that the fundamentals of grammar arise
from fundamentals of human thought, which are shared
by all people and all languages. This is the time-
honoured tradition of universal grammar, now largely
displaced by Chomsky’s structure-based conception of
UG in which meaning plays no real part ?Goddard &
Wierzbicka 1994 : 6 ?6??.’
Given the distinction drawn in this paragraph we now
can ask at least two separate questions : are there univer-
sal ‘fundamentals of grammar’, independent of thought or
meaning? ; are there universal ‘fundamentals of thought’,
independent of grammar? And what is the relationship
between the two? In such a short and general article it
is impossible to answer such questions ; even given more
space, it is unlikely that I would propose any interesting
solution to problems that have vexed philosophers, lin-
guists and religious thinkers for centuries?and cogni-
tive psychologists, since the discipline was invented.
Nevertheless, one can ask questions about the interface
between language and thought?the ways in which we
represent our thoughts linguistically? the theoretical
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study of which is called ?cognitive? semantics. We can
ask : are the semantic categories we construct the same
in all languages? Does every language organize experi-
ence in the same way?
Let’s begin with words and their meanings, since eve-
ryone is agreed that?if nothing else?it is words?in
particular, the basic vocabulary of languages?that distin-
guish one language from another. When we travel
aborad, it is a dictionary or phrase-book that we clutch in
our sweaty palms?not a grammar ; when we do this, it
must be because we believe that it is more than a talis-
man, or good-luck charm. We must think that the dic-
tionary or phrase-book holds the key to communicating
our basic needs and desires. That may be true, but no-
tice that this implicit belief is based on a universalist as-
sumption that words are nothing more or less than labels
for shared concepts : ‘names for things.’ When presented
with an image of a cat, you may say ‘?’, the French
speaker may say ‘un chat’, the Vietnamese speaker will
utter ‘con ’, I may say ‘cat’, but the concept evoked
in our minds by uttering these different sounds, we sup-
pose, is roughly the same in each case. ?Not precisely
the same, of course : you may like or dislike cats, or be
allergic to them, or have one at home, and these contin-
gent facts may alter your mental model of the animal to
some extent?but significantly, such variation is not lin-
guistically determined : you can love or hate cats what-
ever language you speak.?
But matters are often more complex than this, since
there are many cases where words in one language ap-
pear to label concepts for which another language has no
specific lexical item. I am not talking here about words
whose corresponding concepts are highly culture-
specific, and where?rather than translating?we resort
to direct borrowing : for example, when we borrow Japa-
nese words such as giri or wa, or the Dutch word gezellig,
or the German expression Schadenfreude. In such cases,
it could be argued that we actually do have the concept
?or are capable of grasping it, given sufficient cultural
experience?we just don’t have the label, which is why
we borrow. Words like these present problems for trans-
lators and writers of phrase-books, since people gener-
ally insist that there should be a corresponding label in
their language : in such cases, the translation that is of-
fered is often a ‘near neighbour,’ which is where things
become messy.
In fact, even more basic concepts cause problems.
Let’s talk about BREAD and WATER. Consider Fig. 2
below: how many pieces of bread can you see ?alto-
gether??
?????? ??? ????? ?????????
Figure 1. Words ?labels? for CAT
‘?’
‘le chat
‘con 
Figure 2. How many pieces of bread can you see?
The correct answer ?in English? is one. Why not two?
Because the right-hand image is a picture of toast, and
toast and bread are different things. Really : any 5-year
old English child will tell you this. ?I’ve done this experi-
ment with my own boys, 5 and 10 years old, who are both
adamant that there is only one piece of bread in Fig.
2.?3?
The converse effect is also found. Consider now Fig-
ure 3 : how many containers of water are there?
In this case, it is evident to an English speaker that
there are two vessels containing water. It is true that the
water on the left is boiling, but this a purely contingent
property : temperature variation? at least within the
range from 0+100 Celsius?does not disqualify a sub-
stance from being classified as ‘water’. Yet most Japa-
nese speakers would strongly disagree with this assess-
ment : the left-hand picture shows ‘?’, and ‘?’ and ‘?’
are as different for you as ‘bread’ and ‘toast’ are for me.
‘?’ is cold by definition, just as ‘bread’ is by definition
untoasted. This suggests rather clearly that English
‘bread’ and Japanese ‘??’, English ‘water’ and Japanese
‘?’ do not label the same concepts, but subtly different
ones.
Examples like these show that though we might sup-
pose we are talking about the same thing, often we are
not. And yet there are two things to observe about these
contrasts. The first is that in both cases, the difference
is largely one of scope ?or EXTENSION? : the Japanese
label ‘??’ applies to a larger ?more inclusive? set of
referents, including what English speakers label ‘toast’ ;
conversely, the English word ‘water’ has a larger exten-
sion than Japanese ‘?’, including water heated above 40
degrees Celsius ?or whatever the boundary temperature
between ? and ? turns out to be?. And we are both
agreed that unbaked bread is ‘dough /????’, and that
frozen water is ‘ice /?’. This arrangement can be sche-
matized as follows :
These are marked differences then, but hardly earth-
shattering. The second point to observe is that though
the vocabulary we use may influence the way in which
we classify objects as we are talking about them?what
Dan Slobin terms ‘THINKING FOR SPEAKING’ ?7?, this does
not prevent us from sharing a deeper?common?under-
standing of the world. At some level, English speakers
understand that bread and toast are much the same
thing, just as Japanese speakers understand that ? and
? are instances of much the same substance ?H2O? : the
fact that our respective labels are broader or narrower
does not stop us from grasping each other’s concepts.
When we look at some other words however, it is
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Figure 3. How many containers of water can you see?
Japanese ???? ??
English dough bread toast
Japanese ? ? ? ??
English ice water steam
Table 1. The varying scope of linguistic labels
much less clear that we can be said to share the same
concepts. Take the English prepositions ‘in’ and ‘on’, as
for example, as in the sentences ‘The book is in the
drawer’ or ‘The book is on the table.’ In such cases, we
seem to have an intuitive grasp of what English in and on
mean : they correspond to the Japanese post-positional
expressions ?? ??? and the ?? ???, respectively.
But now consider Fig. 4, adapted from work by the
psycholinguists Melissa Bowerman and Soonja Choi
?Choi & Bowerman 1991 ?8?, also Bowerman & Choi
2001? : in which cases can we say that the Figure object
is in or on the Ground object ?
It turns out that the answer to this question varies ac-
cording to the language you speak. As revealed in Fig. 5,
for English speakers all of the scenes except F can be de-
scribed using ‘on’ : the cup is on the table, the bandaid is
on the leg, the picture is on the wall, the handle is on the
door, the apple is on the tree ; in F, the apple is in the
bowl. Dutch speakers, by contrast, categorize these
scenes quite differently : scenes A and B belong together
?they are instances of ‘op’, whereas C, D and E belong
in a different conceptual category, instances of ‘aan’. The
North African language Berber shows a different group-
ing again : here, A is the ‘odd-one-out’, while scenes B-F
are construed as instantiating the same spatial relation-
ship. And though Japanese accords with English con-
cerning the cases at each end of the spectrum ?A and F?,
the scenes in the middle simply don’t form a natural con-
ceptual category of any kind for most Japanese speakers
Conversely, speakers of Castilian Spanish group all of
these scenes together.
Thus, there is considerable diversity with respect to
which scenes are viewed as being ‘of the same kind’, cog-
nitively speaking. Notice that even here there are uni-
versals of a sort, for although there are languages in
which the words corresponding to ‘in’ and ‘on’ span a
narrower or broader range of situations, there are no lan-
guages that ‘skip’ scenes ; for example, languages that
?????? ??? ????? ?????????
Figure 4. Conceptualizing spatial relationships ?Ia : in vs. on?
Figure 5. Conceptualizing spatial relationships ?Ib. Linguistic Variation?
use the same preposition for scenes A and C, but a differ-
ent one to label scenes B and D. In technical jargon, we
would say that there is a universal ‘implicational hierar-
chy’.
In some other ?related? cases, however, speakers of
certain languages have labels for concepts that we find it
difficult to imagine. In concluding our discussion of uni-
versals of semantic categories, consider Figure 6 : with
regard to spatial relationships, which of these pictures
should be grouped together?
For English speakers, the natural categorization of
these pictures is B and C, and A and D, respectively : B
& C are both instances of ‘on-ness’ ?the ring is on the
finger, the apple is on the plate?, while A and D both
instantiate ‘in-ness’ ?the cigarette is in the packet, the
apple is in the bowl?. Korean speakers, on the other
hand, naturally group scenes A and B together, sepa-
rately from C and D, labelling the first group with the
predicate ‘kkita’. Why do they do this? Because for Ko-
rean speakers the relevant property for grouping scenes
is TIGHT-FIT vs. LOOSE-FIT : in scenes A and B, the
figures objects ?cigarette / ring? fit tightly and appropri-
ately with / into the ground object ?packet / finger, respec-
tively?. The notion of containment?being inside or out-
side some container?which is the defining property of
English ‘in-ness’, is irrelevant for Korean speakers ;
thus, they see no common relationship between scenes
A and D.
This evidence suggests that language-particular se-
mantic categories can exert a strong influence on catego-
rization and perception, since unless it is explicitly
pointed out to them, English speakers are quite blind to
a conceptual contrast that is ‘blindingly obvious’ to Kore-
ans, and vice versa. Nevertheless, given time and suffi-
cient experience, we are able to acquire new categories,
which implies that though language influences our every-
day perception, it does not definitively shape our repre-
sentations of reality : we may be guided by our native lan-
guage, but we are not doomed by it.
Before turning to the question of grammatical univer-
sals, specifically, universals of syntax?word-order and
constituency?it is necessary to draw attention to an am-
biguity inherent in the concept of universality. It can be
observed that there are two possible senses of the term
‘universal’ in Universal Grammar : either, that all lan-
guages have essentially the same grammatical and se-
mantic categories ?with minor, superficial variations? ;
or, that languages choose from a large, but finite, range of
grammatical options. The two types of menu available in
a typical European restaurant provide a helpful analogy.
One one hand, one can choose the cheaper menu du jour
?menu of the day?, a highly constrained fixed-price list of
consisting of two or three courses, with perhaps a maxi-
mum of two or three options for each course. Or there
may be no choices at all, in which case, you receive ex-
actly the same as everyone else : Universal Grammar as
‘Hobson’s choice’. Alternatively, one can orderla carte,
from a much longer list of meal options. If one has time,
money and a sense of adventure, the carte is a better
choice than the menu. But even the carte is finite : there
is an infinite number of potential meal options that the
chef will not prepare ; your choices are in fact limited,
even if they extend over twenty pages !
Using this analogy, the question is whether UG is like
the menu ?highly restricted? or like the carte. Strong
Universalists subscribe to the idea of UG as a menu ;
weak Universalists prefer the carte analogy ; Strong Rela-
tivists, by contrast, do not believe that languages are
constrained by any antecedently-given set of grammatical
options : as far as they are concerned, “anything goes”, as
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Figure 6. Conceptualizing spatial relationships ?II ‘Natural Fit’?
A. cigarette /packet B. ring / finger C. apple /plate D. apple /bowl
though the chef is prepared to make any palatable dish
you may choose to order.
Space constraints preclude a discussion of all of the
reasons for rejecting the Strong Relativist option : let it
suffice to observe that research in language typology has
taught us that though there are approximately 6000 lan-
guages spoken in the world today?and though there
have probably been many thousand others spoken in the
pastthere are not 6000 different varieties of grammar. In-
stead, what we observe repeatedly is that historically un-
related languages make use of the same grammatical op-
tions. For example, most of the Semitic languages of the
Near and Middle East ?a group that includes varieties of
Arabic, as well as Modern Hebrew?a language family,
incidently, named after Shem in Genesis 10? share very
many structural characteristics with the Celtic languages
of Western Europe ?a set that includes Irish, Scots
Gaelic, Welsh and Breton?, and also some important
commonalities with Maori and other Polynesian lan-
guages of the South Pacific. Conversely, despite nearly
1000 years of cultural and political dominance from
China, Vietnamese shares more structural ?syntactic?
commonalities with English or French than with Manda-
rin Chinese. These striking structural similarities cannot
come from a shared historical ancestor, nor from areal
contact : the only remaining possibility?or so Chomskyan
linguists conclude?is that they derive from a ‘biological
blue-print’ for language which, like the menus in a res-
taurant, admit of a finite set of grammatical alternatives.
With this in mind, let us consider word-order across
languages. We’ll start with clausal word-order, the nor-
mal ordering of SUBJECT, OBJECT and VERB in a tran-
sitive clause. Though you may not have been explicitly
taught this, you will know that English is basically an
SVO language?the verb comes between the subject and
the object?while Japanese is basically an SOV one ?the
verb typically comes at the end of the sentence following
the subject and the object?. Of course, both languages
can deviate from these basic orders but the basic pattern
is rather rigid, especially in English. Given this contrast,
we can ask about other languages, and other possible
word orders. Logically, there are six possible ways of or-
dering these three constituents : ?SOV, SVO, VSO, VOS,
OVS, OSV?. If there were no universal constraints on
syntax, we might expect, ceteris paribus, a roughly equal
distribution of the world’s languages. Yet this is not the
case, as demonstrated by extensive typological work,
originating with the seminal research of the American
linguist Joseph Greenberg ?Greenberg 1963 ?9??. Table
2 below, adapted from Whaley ?1998? ?10?, shows that
the languages of the world overwhelmingly fall into two
syntactic groups : they are either SOV like Japanese, or
SVO like English.
Moreover, theoretical research and closer examination
of the minority categories have shown that VSO lan-
guages ?like Modern Irish or Classical Arabic? and VOS
languages ?like the Austronesian language Malagasy?
are in fact subtypes of SVO, in which in certain gram-
matical contexts the verb and or the subject are ‘moved’
from their underlying positions ?just as in English con-
stituent questions the ‘wh-phrase’ is moved from the po-
sition in which it is interpreted to the front of the
clause?:
?1? ‘Who did you think that John said that Mary told Bill
to visit ?’?
On this analysis then, over 98? of the world’s lan-
guages in most samples are either basically SVO or SOV.
So far, only one or two languages out of the estimated
?????? ??? ????? ?????????
Word Order Example
Languages
Number Percentage ???
SOV Japanese 180 45
SVO English 168 42
VSO Modern lrish 37 9
VOS Malagasy 12 3
OVS Hixkaryana 5 1
OSV ?? 0 0
Sample Total 402 ?100?
Table 2. Basic Word Order Typology
6000 currently spoken in the world have been found to
display object-initial word order as a basic word order
?and the validity of even these data is contested?. Notice
that this contrasts sharply with the situation of phonetics,
where one finds hundreds of ?to us? weird and exotic
variants : languages that distinguish several types of uvu-
lar or pharyngeal consonants that speakers of Japanese
or English hardly hear as speech sounds ; languages with
as few as three distinct vowel contrasts. And it also con-
trasts with the situation in lexical variation?where word
choice is normally considered to be completely arbitrary.
Indeed, it is precisely the different choices that lan-
guages make in the form of their vocabularies that allows
us to differentiate them in the first place?6000 different
lexicons?6000 different language varieties.
So clausal syntax is quite different in this respect,
instantiating only 1 /3 of the logically possible choices.
But when we look more closely into the syntax of SOV
and SVO languages, we observe that this minor differ-
ence has far-reaching consequences, and that it partly ex-
plains the problem that we started with, namely, why
Japanese is so difficult for English speakers but not for
Koreans, and why Vietnamese?though lexically just as
alien to English as Japanese is, and phonetically even
more so?is relatively easy to acquire if you speak Eng-
lish or French. The answer to this puzzle is not that the
grammars of English and Japanese differ in many ways,
but rather that they differ in one way, consistently ap-
plied.
In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to
grasp the notion of constituency. Sentences are not sim-
ply strings of words : they consist of sub-groups of words
?constituent phrases?and each phrase has a head, a key
word that defines the phrase, and determines its posi-
tion. So, for instance, the English sentence ‘Many people
study English in Japan’ consists of three phrasal constitu-
ents : the subject noun-phrase ‘many people’, headed by
people, a verb-phrase ‘study English’, headed by study and
a prepositional phrase ‘in Japan’, headed by in. Often?
though not always?words that are not heads of phrases
can be omitted, leaving a grammatical sentence ; for this
reason, we can also say ?grammatically? ‘People study.’
But the converse is not usually true : omission of heads
results in ‘Tarzan-talk’, or worse?as in ‘Many English in
Japan’.
Notice that the position of the head of the verb-phrase
in English matches that of the head of the prepositional
phrase : both are head-initial, appearing before their com-
plements. Indeed, prepositions are so-called?from Latin
pre ?meaning before??precisely because they appear
first ; if they appeared after their complements they
would be called postpositions?from Latin post, meaning
after, as in post meridiem ??pm?‘after midday’?. Japa-
nese of course has these postpositions, which comports
with the head-finality of the verb in the verb-phrase ?OV
order? : instead of ?in Japan? you say ?Nihon de?, just as
for ?study English? is ?eigo-o benkyoo suru?.
In very short sentences, these two differences do not
cause a problem, but as we add more and more phrasal
constituents, English and Japanese diverge more and
more. For it turns out that every phrasal consituent has
a head, not just verb-phrases and adpositional phrases.
So, subordinate clauses?both adjunct and complement
clauses?are headed by a subordinating conjunction ; in
the case of sentential complements we call these ele-
ments complementizers. In English, complementizers
precede the clause they modify, in Japanese they follow
it, as in ?2? and ?3?, respectively.
?2? a. ?After ?she left??, I turned off the lights and went
to bed.
b. ?Because ?S it was raining??, I took an umbrella.
c. She ?VP thinks ?CP that ?S those people are very
rich???.
?3? a. ?????????????
b. ?????????????
c.’?????????????????????
In addition, theoretical research has shown that Tense
and Negation are also heads of constituent phrases :
these phrases contain the verb-phrase, just as the verb-
phrase contains the object noun-phrase. Not surprisingly
perhaps, these heads appear initially in English?before
the verb-phrase?but finally in Japanese :
?4? a. Mr Smith ?TP did ?NEGP not ?VP receive ?NP the invita-
tion????
b.?????? ???????? NP? ???? VP?
? NEGP? ??? TP?
In short, at almost every level of grammatical struc-
ture, Japanese is consistently the ‘mirror image’ of Eng-
lish. As anyone who has tried mirror-writing knows, it’s
really difficult if everything is ‘hantai’, the wrong way
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around, and the longer the sentence gets, the harder it
becomes to transform it correctly. Take a English sen-
tence that combines all of the elements I’ve discussed
separately :
?5? a. Mr Smith said that he had not received the invita-
tion because he had been in France visiting his
friends in Paris.
b.?????????????????????
?????????????????????
??
c. GLOSS of ?b? : ?Smith-Nom Paris-be-friend-Acc
visiting France-Loc be because an invitation-Acc
receive-not-did said?
In Japanese, these contituent phrases are pronounced
in very nearly exactly the opposite order. Notice now
that the Korean translation of the English sentence in
?5a?, in ?6a?, shows much the same word order as the
Japanese sentence ?in 5b?, as shown by the gloss ?word-
for-word translation? in ?6b?, which is why Korean is a
breeze if you’re Japanese :
?6? a.  	 
   
  .
b. ?GLOSS? Smith-NOM Paris-in is friend-ACC visit-
ing France-in had-been because invitation-ACC re-
ceive did-not-COMP said
Now consider the Vietnamese translation of this sen-
tence in ?7? below, which is glossed with English words
?in 7b?, to show the word-order more clearly :
?7? a. Smith 	


?
u’?

ã ??
 
?


 

 
Paris.
b. Mr Smith say that he past not receive invitation
because he past be in France visit friend of self in
Paris.
It should be clear from ?7? that once you learn the vo-
cabulary, Vietnamese grammar is not a great stretch for
English speakers ; indeed, compared to Japanese, it’s re-
markably easy ! However, the most important point to
observe is that when we look at constituency independ-
ently of linear order, all four languages show the precisely
the same hierarchical relations : the subject is always the
top-most constituent ; subordinate clauses are always
headed by a subordinating conjunction ?or complemen-
tizer? ; the phrase headed by Tense contains the phrase
headed by Negation, which in turn contains the phrase
headed by the Verb, which contains the phrase headed by
the object noun. The only difference is in the position of
the head in its phrase : heads are always peripheral, but
they can be initial ?to the left? as in English and Viet-
namese, or final ?to the right? as in Japanese and Ko-
rean. The parallels and differences are schematized in
Fig. 7.
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from this
discussion. The first is that this grammatical difference
between these language types is not huge : in fact, it is
completely trivial when one considers all of the logically
possible grammatical rules that could?but don’t?exist.
However, the other conclusion is that this grammatically
trivial difference has far-reaching implications for language
processing, and for foreign language learning. Knowing
?????? ??? ????? ?????????
Figure 7. Consequences of syntactic headedness
TP
?DP? T’
T NEGP
Neg VP
V CP
C TP TP C
CP V
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NEGP T
T’?DP?
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? John? did not say that ?pigs ?are? cute?||? John-ga? ?buta-ga kawaii? to iwa na katta
that English and Japanese have fundamentally the same
grammar, considered hierarchically, doesn’t make it any
easier for us to process each other’s sentences.
In summary, appearances can be deceptive. If one
looks?or listens?merely to the surface form of lan-
guage, one can sometimes imagine that things are more
similar than they really are. In the case of semantic cate-
gorization ?word meaning?, our native languages mislead
us into believing that everyone should draw the same
distinctions between such everyday concepts as bread
and water. On the other hand, when one considers gram-
mar, sentence patterns that seem to be completely alien
to our way of doing things turn out to be the result of a
very minor variation in a universal grammatical rule : a
universal menu with only two choices. In this sense, we
can agree with Roger Bacon’s assertion : ‘Grammar is, in
its essence, one and the same in all languages, even
though it differs in superficial features.’ Which is all just
as well, really, otherwise we could not really understand
each other at all.
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Notes
1? ‘Grammar is, in its essence, one and the same in all
languages, even though it differs in superficial features.’
Jacobson ?1923?.
2? This is the text of a talk originally delivered as the
Kobe College Megumi Association annual lecture in
2011, where I was in receipt of the Megumi Association
Visiting Professorship. I was asked by the conference or-
ganizers to show the relation of my research to Christian
values and teaching.
3? They give different answers though, if they are asked
the same question in Japanese. They are equally clear
that in Figure 1. there are two instances of ‘pan’ and in
Figure 2, only the right-hand picture shows ‘o-mizu’.
Whether adult L2 learners display equally independent
responses is an open question.
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